Istanbul, previously referred to as Constantinople, is said to be 8,000 years old. Being an Indian, absorbing the idea of ancient multi-cultures is not difficult. But Istanbul felt far different than India. Personified, it felt complex and beautiful, yet also seemingly confused. Istanbul is an existence of a “corridor” between Europe and Asia, a word Dan Brown uses in his fictional book Inferno. It is genuinely the modern-day reverent epitome of Eurasia. And so is the amalgamation of cultures that weaves into making it a tapestry of multiple modernities.
Byzantine, also translates to excessively complicated. Similar is the nature of Istanbul’s most famous monument, the Hagia Sophia or AyaSofya in Turkish, meaning Holy Wisdom. As I waited outside in line to enter this auspicious monument, I observed that it was adorned with pastel-colored domes and geometric architecture, prominent in Islamic architecture. The bluish-gray of the crowns merged with the monsoon sky. I’d reached Türkiye with my study group on a cold rainy day from a lifeless winter in Boston. To my surprise, crowds talking loudly, chirping sparrows, contrasting gray crows, and crying white seagulls made me nostalgic. The warmth inside and the noise outside felt like an authentic welcome to Türkiye. I removed my cold wet shoes and put on a scarf to cover my head, to enter Hagia Sophia.
Hagia Sophia is a kaleidoscope of different styles of art. This mesmerizing kaleidoscope includes Byzantine art, Islamic art, and Christian art. Mosaics of the Virgin Mary and Jesus reflect the Roman influence. But take one step further, and you witness the unnerving calligraphy of Allah and his teachings shining in gold. Turn an inch, and you will see four angels supporting the enormous dome that is yet again adorned with Islamic calligraphy on a darker background. On the surface below, you will see a circular, geometric, almost Bauhaus pattern used for the coronation. This pattern includes a rare maroon stone that would apparently only be imported from ancient Egypt and was so expensive that only kings and queens could use it.
I argue that Hagia Sophia accurately represents Istanbul and somewhat, Türkiye. Here, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has continued the age-old tradition of necropolitics. His recent move to make Hagia Sophia into a mosque was revolted by many scholars, preachers, and secularists around the world (Chu, 2023). But the decision was made. He even pushed the pronunciation of Turkey to Türkiye (Istanbul, 2022), reflecting the affirmation of an autonomous self-identity, diverging from its identity molded to fit in the world created by the West. In one of our conversations, I recall a government official corrected my friend when he said Turkey. Türkiye has been a constitutionally secular country since 1928 (Chu, 2023). People are usually unaware of this, considering the beautiful Islamic prayers you absorb five times a day in Istanbul and that 99.8% of the population are Muslims, primarily Sunni (Wilkinson, 2004). But, it is secular by the rule of law.
Leaders of the Ottoman Empire were often mesmerized by the technological capacity and prosperity of European countries, mainly Britain and France. They respected their ways and often imported costly intricately designed bejeweled watches from Europe without ever making a factory in Türkiye. The trade reliance was interdependent; on spices from Türkiye and technological dependence on Europe. This is why much architecture, art, and food is visibly Western influenced, with Mediterranean hues, and Middle-eastern tastes. I was amazed when I visited the palace of Dolmabahce. Here, two domes lie adjacent; one with symmetric geometric art and the other with landscapes and ornamentation. This duality further reminds me of the boat ride under the Bosphorus bridge. One can literally see the Asian subcontinent, and the European continent on two sides. It is astonishing how you can just cross the bridge and change continents in a five-minute walk.
However, politicians have been instrumentalizing this cultural duality to their benefit. President Erdogan’s rhetoric is another such example of rising populism in the 21st-century global order. He has been the premier for over 20 years, threatening a functioning democracy. He attempts to undo this secularism by welcoming more Islamic thought into the constitution. This organized faith for legitimizing nationalism has undoubtedly been a recipe for democratic disaster worldwide. Yet again, it reminds me of my country, India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi almost definitely has an autocratic rule in the largest democracy in the world (Sarfraz, 2023). However, people in Türkiye revolted against his impenetrable regime and hoped that the elections in May 2023 will make a difference, unfortunately not much changed.
This skewed reality of domestic politics in Türkiye reminds me of a story I heard outside Hagia Sophia. Apparently, in the early formation of Constantinople, peasants, workers, and clerks had gathered to riot against the regime of their then King. Opposing parties joined together and rioted against the economic degradation of the city due to the feudalistic and autocratic rule. Unfortunately, it ended with the King mass murdering most of the rioters. Even today, different opposition political parties have joined together to present a good opposition leader in the coming elections. One common theme though is that most people in modern-day Türkiye are opposing Erdogan, as they do not support his economic decisions, more so than his Islamist party. Türkiye currently is experiencing high economic turmoil and inflation. So, I wonder if instead of delving into cultural nuances and perspectives of the society that are much more difficult to change, economic degradation might play a significant factor for locals in their efforts to displace populist leaders. A question for another day perhaps.
The decision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the father of the nation, to reform Türkiye using his six principles of Kemalism into a secular country was partly a consequence of Western influence to modernize (Bozdaglioglu, 2008). As the architect of the Modernisation Movement, he wanted to separate the state and religion. This structural change was probed after the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) and the subsequent formation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. His respect for science and reason made him detach religion from state matters. He believed that if Türkiye was to be a healthy modern democracy, it couldn’t be constitutionally Islamic. While the right to practice any religion, specifically Islam, remains, the right of the constitution to follow the rule of law by man rather than that of Allah’s teachings, also remains. The way of life in Islam or, as a matter of fact, any normative religion can be subject to interpretation which makes it undependable for the rule of law in constitutions, and becomes levy to the abuse of power, to as always, stay in power.
The resistance to modernity in Türkiye can also be seen through the attempts of the Kurdish separatist groups in South-Eastern Türkiye. As they refused Western-influenced modernity and believed in the state power of Islam, the Kurdish people aimed at forming a separate Kurdistan, an Islamic state, in the early 1920s. Enforcing and eradicating this ideology became important as it was perceived as a national threat to Türkiye. The consequential military proliferation led to violence and a refugee crisis. Türkiye also enforced its language and tried eliminating the Kurd culture altogether. Create conflict to resolve conflict. An immature call to action that has never materialized, as we have seen from the examples of the interventions of the United States in several of its Middle-Eastern operations.
The United States has been an ally of Türkiye since World War 2, yet the bilateral relationship seems quite fractured. This fracture has two-fold reasons; one is the US supplying arms to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), to support the US's War on Terror in its active efforts to eliminate ISIS, and two, is its exaggerated rise in Islamophobia since 9/11 (Alfonseca, 2021). Its recurrent cultural divide results in a constant distrust for Türkiye, a lack of credibility when it comes to the US. A Turkish politician argued, "The US must stop exporting its ideology to countries it does not understand." And thus, we see Türkiye's cultural “identity” (Bozdaglioglu, 2008) increasingly “playing an essential role in its foreign policy”.
During the Anglo-Turkish War (1914), Ahmed V, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire called for Jihad, where he called upon all Muslims to protect the homeland, against the Triple Entente . But, this action was reversed during the World Wars when the Ottoman Empire allied with France and England during the Crimean War (1853) and continued the alliance during World War 2. To this day, Türkiye maintains convoluted relationships with the West (meaning the United States of America and the EU) and with Russia.
Given its alliance with its neighbors in the West, Türkiye is a part of NATO and has a poor relationship with neighbors in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (particularly Greece, Syria, and Iran). Türkiye has also, for decades, attempted accession into the European Union. But, despite several attempts and please Europe through its policies and modern culture, it has remained just an ally. This disappointment has been disputed to also be a part of clashing cultural identities where the EU is predominantly white Christians and Turkish people are brown Muslims. With increasing populism in countries such as Italy and France, conservative governments in the West seem to keep Türkiye at a safe distance.
So much so that European governments, as well as the US, have been externalizing (Altunkaya, 2023) their refugee migrants from Syria (owing to the refugee crisis due to the Syrian Civil War in 2011) to Türkiye. Approximately 3.6 million Syrians have entered Türkiye in one decade (World Bank, 2021), and now are witnessing increasing numbers of Ukrainian refugees (owing to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022), too. Our group heard several politicians and scholars mentioning the preferential treatment of Ukrainians from European countries compared to the Syrian refugees. This is another example of discrimination, bias, and bigotry of white Christians against Muslim migrants. But, while most of the Turkish people have been accepting of the Syrian refugees, given they are also Sunni Muslims, some local examples of clashes exist.
Türkiye is a unique example of an “Islamic modernity” (Bozdaglioglu, 2008). This term attempts to define Islamic societies that modernize and adapt to the rest of the world without losing their core Islamic principles and practices. Historically, the recurrent friction between the Roman and the Ottoman Empires were clashes of expansion, culture, and identity. Christianity promotes individualism, while most religions of the East, including Islam, are more communal or tribal. Even the platter of food served during Iftar is a shared platter. This clash of Christianity and Islam was a recurrence at the fall of the Ottoman Empire. But this time, it was also with Russian Christians. An unfortunate cyclical consequence of this lack of acceptance seems to have exaggerated the dominance of traditional Islamic thought in several countries, such as Iran and Afghanistan. A vigorous denial of modernity. This denial also includes women's lack of equal rights and freedoms.
When it comes to Russia, Türkiye is said to maintain "a marriage of convenience", being heavily dependent on Russian energy exports, construction, and a backup in case of Western dominance. Yet, it has opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is ideologically Western but economically Eastern. This dualism in foreign policy is a vicarious reflection of the mixed culture in Türkiye. This is why Türkiye seems to play a neutral role, instead of adhering to the EU sanctions on Russian gas. It is still being disputed in research circles whether this role is really neutral or mostly advantageous. But while it can create a reason for questioning their alliance with the West, it is economically senseless for Türkiye to adhere to the sanctions. Instead, Türkiye can be a facilitator in Russia-Ukraine negotiations again (Malsin, 2022) when the situation is ripe.
Though I have written quite positively about the Islamic modernity in Türkiye, like most powers, it has not been shy of ethically wrongful acts. The Ottoman Empire was responsible for the genocide of the Armenian people, culture, and identity during World War 1. This genocide was a cyclical response to the instrumentalization of the fear that Armenia would ally with the Ottoman Empire’s Christian opposition countries during the First World War. To date, Türkiye supports Azerbaijan, the Muslim-dominant country, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against Armenia, which is a Christian-dominant country. The diplomatic ties between Türkiye and Armenia are currently virtually absent.
An important aspect of Islamic modernity is its struggle to define the characteristics and role of LGBTQ members in its communities (Turkey: Mass Arrests, Anti-LGBT Violence at Pride, 2022). A bullet to ideologies is often responded to with another bullet. Western countries are revolting against these human rights abuses, which threaten the self-identity of traditionalists. The lack of empathy, acceptance, and respect for diverse cultures worldwide has historically been a barrier in diplomatic relations. Barrier enough that it has caused violence and bloodshed, and continues to do so, merely for the short-term benefits of domestic politicians. To fit in the global order and respect human rights, constitutions must be inclusive and adapt to newer realities. I am unsure how this cyclic and brutal weaponization of culture to “secure” or hurt demography could be abolished.
References
Alfonseca, K. (2021, September 11). 20 years after 9/11, Islamophobia continues to haunt Muslims. ABC News; ABC News.
Altunkaya, T. (2023, March 30). What will happen to Turkey’s EU migrant deal if the opposition wins? Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/30/what-will-happen-to-turkeys-eu-migrant-deal-if-the-opposition-wins-the-election
Bozdaglioglu. (2008). Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Insight (Türkey), 10(1), 55–75.
Chu, B. (2023, January 18). The Hagia Sophia: A landmark that was converted from a church to a mosque, to a museum, and then mosque again. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/world/hagia-sophia-landmark-converted-church-mosque-museum-mosque-again
Dalacoura. (2021). Global IR, global modernity and civilization in Turkish Islamist thought: a critique of culturalism in international relations. International Politics (Hague, Netherlands), 58(2), 131–147. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00242-8
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Malsin, J. (2022, May 30).Turkey Offers Again to Host Russian-Ukrainian Peace Talks. WSJ. Retrieved March 30, 2023, from https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-05-28/card/turkey-offers-again-to-host-russian-ukrainian-peace-talks-7ZiiQCjHKjuNs8vJhxSm
Sarfraz H. (2023, March 5). Modi’s India: a digital autocracy in the making | The Express Tribune. (2023, March 5). Tribune.com.pk.
Turkey: Mass Arrests, Anti-LGBT Violence at Pride. (2022, June 30). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/30/turkey-mass-arrests-anti-lgbt-violence-pride
Wilkinson, T. (2004, October 12). Is Turkey Muslim or Modern? Europe Asks. Los Angeles Times; Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-oct-12-fg-turkey12-story.html
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